Court question suggests win incoming for Trump on defunding
President Donald Trump watches as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent participates in a ceremonial swearing-in of Paul Atkins as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the Oval Office of the White House, Tuesday, April 22, 2025, in Washington (AP Photo/Alex Brandon).
The Trump administration received a welcome court order on Friday in a case implicating the federal spending freeze and immigrant rights.
In a lengthy minute order, Washington, D.C.-based U.S. District Judge Randolph D. Moss, a Barack Obama appointee, expressed severe doubts about the entire basis of the complaint in the months-old case.
On Jan. 31, the plaintiffs, led by the Amica Center for Immigrant Rights, sued the Department of Justice over a plan to slash funding for several “critical legal orientation programs.”
“The DOJ’s decision to shut down these national legal access programs poses a significant threat to the rights of immigrant children, adults, and families, especially those detained by the government,” Amica said in a press release announcing the lawsuit. “These legal orientation programs are crucial, as they provide immigrants — the vast majority of whom are unrepresented, and many of whom are confused and traumatized, do not speak English, and lack any legal education — with essential information about their rights throughout the immigration process and deportation proceedings.”
But since then, both motions practice and hearings have largely gone the government’s way in the Washington, D.C. district court. While the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order was denied, their motion for a preliminary injunction remains to be decided.
Friday’s order suggests the court is leaning against enjoining anything.
In late April, the government moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. In their motion, the DOJ argued the case “is about a contract” and, citing recent Supreme Court precedent, that federal courts have no jurisdiction “to order the federal government to ‘pay … money’ under a contract — the very relief that Plaintiffs demand here.”
In essence, the government says the plaintiffs are in the wrong court.
Rather, the government says, the contract nature of the dispute means the litigation is governed by the obscure Tucker Act of 1887. Under this law, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to rule on “any claim” against the federal government that relies “upon any express or implied contract with the United States.”
On Thursday, the coalition of nonprofits pilloried the Trump administration’s lawyers in a motion in opposition, calling out the defendants for allegedly misunderstanding the thrust of the case.
“From its very first sentence, the Motion rests on the demonstrably false premise that this is a ‘contract’ case involving ‘contract-based claims for monetary relief’ But Defendants cannot point to any part of the amended complaint that alleges breach of contract or seeks monetary damages or retroactive reimbursement,” Amica argues. “That is because Plaintiffs make no such claim.”
The plaintiffs’ language then gets even harsher:
Plaintiffs do not even have a contract with Defendants, let alone a breach of contract claim. Defendants may be right that a different complaint, by different plaintiffs, in a different case, raising claims for monetary damages based on a breach of contract, could be subject to the Tucker Act and could belong within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. But that is not this complaint, and it is not this case.
On Friday, however, Amica’s efforts to rubbish the government’s contract framework apparently did not convince the court.
In his order, Moss said both parties should be prepared to address the plaintiffs’ standing at the hearing initially scheduled last month.
The judge went on to explain the shift in focus — by largely agreeing with how the Trump administration views the basic case.
“In particular, the parties should address the question of redressability for Plaintiffs’ financial injury,” Moss writes. “The direct cause of Plaintiffs’ financial injury appears to be the termination of their contracts by Acacia, a nongovernmental, private entity that is not before the Court as a party to this action.”
In the government’s motion to dismiss, the DOJ explains the lineage of the four immigrant legal aid programs subject to funding cuts.
“[The Executive Office for Immigration Review] contracted with non-party Acacia Center for Justice, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization, to manage the Programs,” the motion reads. “Acacia in turn subcontracted with various legal services organizations, including Plaintiffs, to deliver Program services on the ground at covered detention facilities and immigration courts.”
This state of affairs, the court suggests, works against the plaintiffs.
From the minute order, at length:
As a result, even if the Court were to grant the relief Plaintiffs seek — “enjoin” Defendants from “terminat[ing]” their “compliance with the mandate in the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2024 to fund” the Programs — the remedy for their financial injury seems to depend on (1) Defendants choosing to reinstate their contract with Acacia and (2) Acacia choosing to reinstate its contracts with Plaintiffs.
In other words, Moss appears to be pre-endorsing the government’s position that the nature of the various agreements at issue depends not only on contract law, but on several distinct contracts.
The judge’s order ends with a line that may prove ominous for the nonprofits altogether: “The Court seeks clarification as to whether Plaintiffs have met their evidentiary burden.”
