India dispatch: government-governor conflicts in southern states deepen fault lines and regional tensions – JURIST
The correspondent filing this dispatch is a law student at Maharashtra National Law University in Mumbai who must remain anonymous.
On Tuesday, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India (‘SCI’) delivered its judgement in State of Tamil Nadu v. R.N. Ravi (‘R.N. Ravi’), setting yet another precedent in a line of cases limiting the discretionary powers of Governors. The Indian federal set-up provides for the Constitutional office of the Governor as the de jure executive and head of a state, nominated and appointed by the Centre through the President. The de facto executive is the Chief Minister (‘CM’), the leader of the majority party in the State Legislative Assembly.
The Governor’s post was originally conceived to be politically neutral, with the members of the Constituent Assembly preferring a person “cut away from party politics” to be nominated as a Governor and act as the agent of the central government. However, the politicisation of this position has persisted through the appointment of career politicians and their consequent conduct as Governors. This creates friction with states where the ruling dispensation differs from the party in power at the Centre, ultimately becoming a battleground of contrasting party interests.
In the present case, the SCI intervened to implement ten pending bills in Tamil Nadu, thereby resolving a deadlock caused by Governor R.N. Ravi’s prolonged inaction in withholding assent without explanation. This decision sparked widespread discourse across the country, with other opposition-ruled states welcoming this move as a restriction of gubernatorial discretion over legislative processes.
While such tensions have historically existed across party lines, the current political scenario demonstrates that these hostilities are especially prevalent in the southern states- namely Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana and Tamil Nadu (‘four states’), where the current ruling dispensations are in opposition to the National Democratic Alliance (‘NDA’) at the centre. Andra Pradesh seems to be the only exception among the five southern states, as the NDA has found its footing and commanded a majority under the leadership of CM Chandrababu Naidu.
As recently as February, the four states jointly opposed the Draft University Grants Commission Guidelines, raising concerns of centralisation by vesting wide appointment powers with the Governor. Such apprehensions of the erosion of federalism have been pronounced in all four states in their respective tussles with the Governor. In Kerala, CM Pinarayi Vijayan has raised concerns over the centre’s fiscal treatment of the state, with a petition pending before the SCI regarding the extent of the state’s power to borrow funds from the Union.
The government had filed another petition similar to that in R.N. Ravi in terms of the pendency of eight bills. It sought, among other prayers, a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to dispose of the bills. The SCI is likely to decide in favour of Kerala, having already established a timeline for the exercise of the Governor’s discretionary powers in R.N. Ravi. However, it is curious to note that the SCI did not club these matters despite the nearly identical subject matter in both of these cases. The Kerala case is now listed for hearing in the second half of May, which may seem redundant given that the position of law has now been decisively settled.
The Karnataka experience is unique, as it has historically voted contrary to the party at the Centre, with few exceptions. The landmark S.R. Bommai case, which firmly established federalism as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, arose from the dismissal of the State Legislative Assembly in Karnataka based on the Governor’s report. It is pertinent to note that the backdrop was yet another contrarian state election result, as the Janata Party (later the Janata Dal) had formed a majority in the state, whereas the Indian National Congress (‘INC’) was at the helm in the Centre.
Karnataka is currently ruled by the INC, and there exist tensions between CM Siddaramaiah and Governor Gehlot over various issues, ranging from a bill seeking to restructure municipal corporations to the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor at a state university and more sensationally, the sanctioning of the prosecution of Siddaramaiah in a land allotment case.
In Telangana, the relations between the government and the Governor have somewhat thawed, without any major dispute in recent times. However, yet another petition filed in 2023 points to the pervasive problem of the Governor indefinitely sitting on bills duly passed by the competent legislatures. Although the petition was disposed of after the Governor eventually acted, it is telling that this came only after the government was compelled to approach the SCI. It is neither practical nor desirable for an elected government to seek judicial intervention each time to secure assent for a bill. The timeline prescribed in R.N. Ravi is thus a welcome clarification of the Governor’s discretionary powers.
The ongoing conflicts between the CM and Governor in these states are yet another manifestation of increasing regional tensions as the South pushes back against the perceived imposition of Hindi-language and north-Indian dominance by the BJP. The stage is now set to observe how the SCI’s decision in R.N. Ravi could alter the balance of power between state governments and Governors, potentially setting a crucial precedent for navigating federal tensions in India’s constitutional framework.
Opinions expressed in JURIST Dispatches are solely those of our correspondents in the field and do not necessarily reflect the views of JURIST’s editors, staff, donors or the University of Pittsburgh.
